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DDAS Accident Report
Accident details
Report date: 19/07/2011

Accident number: 783

Accident time: 09:32

Accident Date: 17/03/2008

Where it occurred: AF/0308/01637,
MF0180, Qalai Ahmad
Khan Village, Bagram
District, Parwan
Province
Primary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Country: Afghanistan

Secondary cause: Management/control
inadequacy (?)

Class: Other

Date of main report: None

ID original source: (4)

Name of source: UNMACCA

Organisation: [Name removed]
Mine/device: AP blast (unrecorded)

Ground condition: not recorded
Date last modified: 19/07/2011

Date record created:
No of victims: 1

No of documents: 1

Map details
Longitude:

Latitude:

Alt. coord. system: Not recorded

Coordinates fixed by:

Map east:

Map north:

Map scale:

Map series:

Map edition:

Map sheet:

Map name:

Accident Notes
inadequate investigation (?)
inconsistent statements (?)
visor not worn or worn raised (?)
inadequate area marking (?)

Accident report
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons
Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting
being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more
information becomes available.
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The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity.

LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF DEMINING ACCIDENT INVOLVING [Demining
group] DT# 02
INTRODUCTION:
An investigation team was convened by Area Manager of AMAC Centre (Kabul) to investigate
the demining accident involving [the Victim] the acting section leader of [Demining group] DT
# 02. The accident occurred at 09:32 hours on 17 March 2008 at task #
AF/0308/01637/MF0180 located in Qalai Ahmad Khan Village, Bagram District of Parwan
Province.
SUMMARY:
MF# AF/0308/01637/MF0180 is part of a contaminated area which was recorded by LIS as
SHA#3 of impacted community # 1222. The area is contaminated with AP mines by Russian
forces for security of aircraft ammunition store located at the area during the year 1984.
On 17 March 2008, at 09:32 am, a demining accident happened on [the Victim] a deminer of
[Demining group] DT#2 who was appointed as acting section leader of section-02.
According to claim of team, while the acting section leader was checking a lane cleared by
one of team party and wanted to fix the location of a marking stone suddenly the stone fell
down to un-cleared area and hit top of a mine/UXO causing it to explode.
The acting section leader was dressed with PPE, but his visor was up, and as a result the
victim acting section leader got injuries on his eye, leg, parts of his body.
After applying first aid at the site the victim was shifted to Bagram Airbase Egyptian Hospital.
The victim was admitted to the hospital at about 10:00 am and as his wounds were not much
serious, he was discharged from the hospital next day of the accident.
CONCLUSIONS:
A. The accident point which was shown to investigation team is located at the vicinity of safety
margin of two meters wide clearance lane. During clearance of the lane the relevant party has
not found any hazardous component and also there is no any visible hazardous item around
the cleared lane.
B. The investigation team did not find any sign of uncontrolled detonation or any debris of the
exploded item caused the accident in and around the crater of the explosion; this reveals that
this crater has not been created by explosion of any hazardous device.
C. The scenario stated by the team did not seem to be true; as If the stone has fallen from left
hand of the victim, left side of his leg/body had to be injured, but the wounds of the victim are
in front of his body and also his accompanying person has not received any injuries.

2

Victim Report
Victim number: 969

Name: [Name removed]
Gender: Male

Age:
Status: supervisory

Fit for work: not known

Compensation: Not made available

Time to hospital: Not made available

Protection issued: Frontal apron

Protection used: Frontal apron

Long visor

Summary of injuries:
INJURIES: minor Body; minor Eye; minor Leg
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. ". . . acting section leader got injuries on
his eye, leg, parts of his body".

Analysis
The primary and secondary causes of this accident are listed as Management Control
Inadequacy because the Victim was a Field supervisor and the investigators found that the
details surrounding the accident were fabricated. The group’s management bears
responsibility for controlling its field supervisors and ensuring that accidents are reported
honestly so that lessons to avoid repetition can be derived from them. The Lessons Learned
summary does not include recommendations for the demining group’s management to
change, and so lacks any Lessons Learned - which is an unusual omission.
The device in this accident is recorded as an AP blast mine because it was likely to have
been a pressure operated device and the injuries are similar to AP blast injuries.
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years,
so ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. It is noteworthy that the Afghan national staff have
been more responsible than those internationals who presume greater responsibility.
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